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Abstract
This article examines how the Chinese government, at both central and lo-
cal levels, has supported solar PV equipment manufacturing to increase its 
share in the global market, despite its innate disadvantages in this industry. 
Much of China's early expansion of manufacturing sectors can be attributed 
to its competitive advantages in cheap labour and good infrastructure, as 
well as the alleged undervaluation of the Chinese currency. However, China's 
formidable progress in the capital-intensive solar PV industries, where these 
advantages were no longer functioning effectively, has raised interesting 
questions about hidden stimulus factors like direct government subsidies, 
cheap land, technology support and easy credit provided by the govern-
ment or other state sectors, like state-owned banks and research institutes. 
China's emergence as the world's largest manufacturer in these nascent 
industries has global economic repercussions. This research aims to expli-
cate the Chinese business model from the perspective of state capitalism, 
a quasi-market system that has been integrated into the global economy, 
but which remains under the command of an authoritarian regime with a 
central planning mindset that makes innovative use of domestic leverages 
to subsidize strategic industries and achieve international competitiveness. 
Keywords: China, Manufacture, Solar PV, State Capitalism, Subsidy
Introduction  
With the new norm of carbon-constraints, in which emissions of green-
house gases can no longer be assumed to be costless, solar photovoltaic 
(PV) electricity generation represents a promising renewable energy 
source. As a latecomer to PV production, China swiftly surpassed bell-
wethers like the United States and Japan by quadrupling its solar panel 
manufacture capacity between 2009 and 2011. By 2013, China accounted 
for 67 percent of the global module production, while the shares for 
Europe, Japan and the United States slid to 9 percent, 5 percent and 2.6 
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percent, respectively (REN21 2014: 48). Massive investment and capacity 
built up in China led to serious oversupply in the international market 
and drove down module prices by more than 75 percent (REN21 2013: 
47). As a result of China's fast-growing market share, both the EU and 
the United States launched anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investiga-
tions of the country's solar panel shipments, which became the biggest 
commercial disputes of their kind in history.1   
 The comparative advantages that China has accumulated during the 
short period in which it has been producing solar photovoltaic modules 
are outstanding, and defy standard explanations of China's manufacture 
competitiveness based on cheap labour, good infrastructure or the al-
leged undervaluation of the Chinese currency. In the nascent solar PV 
manufacture industry that has emerged amidst global concerns about 
climate change and energy security, labour formed just a tiny portion of 
manufacturing costs (Haley and Haley 2013: 1), while capital, technol-
ogy, land, environmental regulation and scale of production are more 
crucial factors in determining competitiveness. China has been on the 
rise economically for more than three decades, successfully taking the 
position of the world's second largest economy and largest exporter. In 
the take-off stage of its economic miracle, much of China's competitive-
ness in manufacturing and exports was credited to abundant supply 
of cheap labour and land, which led to a high concentration of manu-
facturing sectors that produced low-value-added commodities, such as 
apparel, shoes, toys and kitchenware, for the global market. 
However, since acceding to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
December 2001, China, a late-comer to modernization, propelled many 
of its industries upward along the global value chain and successfully 
captured the high ground in clusters of capital-intensive or tech-in-
tensive manufacturing industries, among which steel, glass, paper, 
auto-parts and telecommunication products (smart-phones, tablets, 
etc.) were some of the best-known. Labour costs usually account for 
less than 10 percent of the total costs associated with these production 
activities and, more importantly, wages in the Chinese manufacturing 
sector experienced a 71 percent hike between 2008 and 2012,2 making 
China a much more expensive place for hiring workers compared to 
neighbouring countries, such as Vietnam and Cambodia. Thus China's 
traditional advantage of low cost labour could not fully explain its swift 
success in these industrial sectors.    
As China's economic growth transcended its historical reliance upon 
labour-intensive industries to move towards capital-intensive industries, 
92 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 33(1)•2015
Chen Gang ________________________________________________________________
the country's exports have become markedly more sophisticated and 
contain more high-tech and machinery goods than pure comparative-
advantage theories had forecast. The exacerbated trade imbalance in 
China's favour has forced Western countries to pin their hopes of regain-
ing industrial competitiveness on the development of newly-emerging 
manufacture sectors like the production of wind turbines and solar 
panels. However, even for such unploughed ﬁelds, in which China had 
no comparative advantage a decade ago, it has managed to snatch the 
high ground from the control of its formidable peers in the United States, 
Japan and Europe in a short period. Other major emerging economies 
like India or Brazil have failed to take such strides in this industry. In 
India, for example, most manufacturing capacity was idle or operating 
at low utilization rates, primarily because it was uncompetitive due to 
lack of scale, insufﬁcient ﬁnancing and under-developed supply chains 
(REN21 2014: 48).   
China's explosive development in the new ﬁeld of solar PV manu-
facturing, which could not be explained from the conventional per-
spective of comparative advantages, should instead be scrutinized 
through the theoretical lens of state capitalism, a common East Asian 
developmental model in which states play a signiﬁcant and sometimes 
decisive role in industrialization and markets (Johnson 1995; Hobson 
1997; Weiss 1998; Wong 2004; Fligstein and Zhang 2011). The Chinese 
model of state capitalism has been prominently discussed in the study 
of the country's meteoric economic growth in the past two decades 
(McGregor 2012; Lin and Jiang 2011; Fligstein and Zhang 2011; Nolan 
2007). One of the fascinating aspects of this growth is the enormous 
subsidies provided in multi-layered, covert forms by the government. 
This study, using empirical evidence, aims to show that the Chinese gov-
ernment has substantially subsidized the strategically important solar 
PV manufacturing sector with producer subsidies, research grants, tax 
rebates, low-interest loans and cheap land. It argues that China would 
not have had such a competitive advantage if it had not been for such 
governmental intervention. Having sought to replicate aspects of the 
'developmental state' model pioneered by Japan (Terry 2002), China's 
interventionist state approach in fact represents complex dialectical 
processes that have been shaped by and have responded to a complex 
array of contingent economic and political forces. Compared with the 
Japanese developmental pattern, in which central government agencies 
simply planned the development process and calibrated industrial poli-
cies (Beeson 2009: 9), China's state capitalism encourages both central 
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and local governments to play a straightforward role in supporting lo-
cal industries with various forms of ﬁnancial aid and services. China's 
developmental miracle owes much to the socialist heritage of the Maoist 
era, which instituted a strong Leninist party-state and a concentration 
of power in the Communist Party of China (Walder 1994: 297-323). This 
model tends to promote state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the expense 
of private actors in pillar industries (zhizhu chanye), but for emerging 
industries (xinxing chanye) where no national champions can be identi-
ﬁed, the local authorities are often ready to offer generous help for these 
indigenous ﬁrms, regardless of their ownership structures.   
Porter's national competitiveness theory argued that governments, 
by reshaping factor conditions, demand conditions, related industries 
and ﬁrm strategy,3  can play an indirect role in helping industries gain 
competitive advantages (Porter 1998: 72-127). Using the case study of 
China's solar subsidies, this article aims to reveal through what means 
government agencies, under the Chinese pattern of state capitalism, 
are helping indigenous industries to be competitive internationally. 
The study focuses on the real impact of government subsidies and 
other forms of support on factor and demand conditions, supporting 
industries and ﬁrm strategy. 
China Lacks Innate Competitiveness in Solar PV 
Manufacturing 
The exploration of solar energy to date is divided into two main catego-
ries: solar thermal for the use of solar heat and solar PV for electricity 
power generation. China, as the largest market for solar thermal appli-
cations, has a long history of utilizing solar thermal technologies, but 
it is a late-comer for solar PV manufacture and application compared 
to industrial pioneers like Germany, Italy and the United States. In its 
infant stage of solar PV manufacture, China was weak in terms of tech-
nologies for producing the raw material for solar PV, polycrystalline 
silicon. Despite the establishment of a number of research institutes and 
universities dedicated to research and development (R&D) for solar PV 
between 1986 and 2005, advancement of PV technologies was slow in 
China (Yang and Pan 2010: 14). In the early days, China did not have 
competitive PV-related knowledge resources that resided in universi-
ties, government research institutes, private research facilities, business 
and scientiﬁc literature and market research databases (Chen 2015: 101). 
China had to import 95 percent of its PV raw materials due to a lack 
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of advanced technologies for producing polycrystalline silicon, and it 
exported 95 percent of its ﬁnished products due to an underdeveloped 
domestic market (Li 2010: 38; Chen 2015: 98). In the solar PV industrial 
chain that includes production of crystalline silicon, silicon ingot and 
wafer, solar cells, modules and arrays, China was only able to manu-
facture a small proportion of global silicon material in the upstream 
while it accounted for about half of global production capacity for cells 
and modules in the downstream. In the nascent stage, China was weak 
in the upstream of the PV industrial chain, namely silicon production, 
while it was strong in the labour-intensive downstream, including cell 
production and PV module encapsulation (see Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1: China's Manufacturing Capability in the Solar PV Industrial 
Chain (2008-2009)(Yang and Pan 2010:25)
Industrial 
Chain
Silicon Ingot/Wafer Cells Modules PV Arrays
Features
Capital-in-
tensive; high 
technical 
threshold; 
long  
payback 
period; 
high energy 
consumption; 
and poison-
ous emis-
sions. 
High techni-
cal barrier; 
decrease in 
the thick-
ness of sili-
con wafers 
is an effec-
tive way to 
reducing the 
cost of PV 
cells.
Large-scale 
production 
is crucial; 
medium-
level capital 
and techni-
cal thresh-
old.
Low capital 
and technical 
threshold; 
labour-inten-
sive; short 
payback 
period; and 
ﬁerce compe-
tition.
Low 
technical 
threshold 
but com-
prehensive 
use of com-
bined tech-
nologies is 
required. 
Manu-
facturing 
Competi-
tiveness in 
China
Weak Medium Strong Strong Strong
Production of high purity polycrystalline silicon, the basic feedstock 
of solar cells, has always been the cause of China's bottleneck situation 
in the industrial chain (Li and Ma 2009). Despite its rich silicon reserves, 
China was lagging behind in the processing of silicon puriﬁcation at 
the international level in the mid-2000s; much of its high energy con-
sumption and emission of poisonous waste was owing to backward 
technologies and lack of strict regulation. Although challenges such 
as low efﬁciency and pollution also existed in other countries, China's 
situation was more extreme. As for the ingot and wafer production, the 
second stage of the industrial chain, China's silicon ingot slicing indus-
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try was relatively mature at the international level, with thinner wafers 
developed and thus less silicon feedstock needed. However, since the 
status of silicon ingot and wafer production is still largely dependent 
on the silicon feedstock, there was still a signiﬁcant gap between China 
and some industrialized countries in terms of wafer production skills. In 
contrast to its weak competitiveness in the upstream, China was strong 
in the downstream solar cell manufacturing and module encapsulation 
in which the advantage of low labour costs is particularly important.      
The high energy consumption and emission of poisonous waste in 
the production of high purity polycrystalline silicon have added both 
economic and ecological costs to China's PV manufacturing efforts. 
China's early solar production was beset by problems similar to those 
that India's PV production is now facing: high levels of pollution and 
high energy costs, fragmented manufacturing capacity, lack of scale, 
an underdeveloped local capital market and lagged research and de-
velopment. 
The explanation for China's later triumph and India's stagnation in 
PV production can be found through the study of factor distortion un-
der the framework of state capitalism. Historically, India has had more 
of a free-market orientation than China,4 and its state sector is more 
fragmented, decentralized and less interventionist when compared to 
China's government apparatus. Sharing a similarly humble industrial 
basis, China's PV manufacturing has outrun India's, largely due to the 
interventionist role played by a strong Chinese government.  
Subsidies under State Capitalism 
China is a game-changer in global solar PV manufacturing, as its revenue 
share in the world market surged from an insigniﬁcant portion before 
2005 to more than 50 percent in 2011 and 2012. Since the production of 
solar cells and modules is a capital- and tech-intensive industry in which 
China had no comparative advantage a decade ago, its swift success in 
snatching up the high ground from the control of formidable peers in 
the United States and Europe has shocked many industrial observers, 
particularly those with the expectation that the Western world should 
alleviate the trade imbalance through the development this high-tech 
sector. China's existing production capacity for solar panels was about 
150 percent of global real demand in 2012, and in just four years between 
2009 and 2012, the international price of solar panels had been cut by 
more than 75 percent, largely due to an aggressive capacity build-up 
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in China (REN21 2013: 47). Both the EU and the US authorities have 
accused China of illegal state subsidies and widespread dumping in 
the drive for industrial competitiveness, though this doesn't take into 
account the reality that EU and US production costs were actually lower 
China's. As noted, compared with other industrialized nations, China 
is well-known for its advantages in the supply of cheap labour; but in 
solar PV manufacturing, labour accounts for a small part, less than 10 
percent of total cost (Chen 2015: 101). Both the EU and US authorities 
found that the Chinese government's generous subsidies had helped 
its PV producers to gain comparative advantages by reshaping the 
country's factor conditions, which included human resource input, 
infrastructure, knowledge resources and the capital market. 
Porter's theory links government industrial policies to the economic 
successes of some East Asian countries, whose comparative advantages 
beneﬁt indirectly from these policies that reshape the circumstances 
of the four determinants in a positive way (Porter 1998: 126). In these 
developmental states, factor conditions like labour, land, raw materi-
als, capital, and infrastructure are often remoulded by the government 
through subsidies and supportive policies, while indigenous demand 
can also be reframed by local product standards, government procure-
ment and consumption subsidies. Under the Chinese model of state capi-
talism in which many manufacturing industries are backed by proactive 
government policies, China's solar panel production has long featured 
the highest localization rates for its equipment, the lowest technological 
threshold, the largest number of small- and medium-sized businesses, 
and the greatest expansion in the global PV manufacturing industry. 
  China's 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), the Renewable Energy Law 
(2005) and its amendment (2009), as well as the Medium- and Long-
Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy (2007) have provided 
programmatic guidance systems for the government support of domestic 
solar manufacture. Since 2008, when China's exports were hit hard by 
the global ﬁnancial crisis, the central government has asked local govern-
ments to support renewable energy industries as emerging industries of 
strategic importance (zhanlue xinxing chanye), which could serve as a 
new engine for strong economic growth. Following what had been done 
in supporting heavy and chemical industries in the 2000s, the multi-layer 
government apparatus subsidized domestic solar panel production in a 
similar way, providing cheap land-use rights, cheap credit, tax rebates, 
research funds, and sometimes even straight-up cash.      
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Major Forms of Chinese Subsidies 
As with other manufacturing sectors, the Chinese government, at both 
central and local levels, provides factories along the industrial chain of 
PV manufacturing with various forms of subsidies, which include free or 
low-cost loans, tax rebates, research grants, cheap land, energy subsidies 
and technological, infrastructure and personnel support. One of the easy 
ways for local governments to support indigenous PV producers is to 
instruct local commercial banks to offer bountiful loans at low interest. 
By lowering the costs of capital, subsidized credit supports PV manufac-
turers regardless of their productivity levels, even if some of these loans 
may face high risk of default. In many cases, local ofﬁcials encouraged 
entrepreneurs to take more loans from local banks for capacity expan-
sion, regardless of oversupply and competitiveness problems. It was 
reported that in 2005, after a mere half-an-hour conversation with Peng 
Xiaofeng, CEO of LDK Solar (which later became the world's second-
largest maker of solar wafers), Mayor Wang Dehe of Xinyu City, Jiangxi 
Province, immediately asked local banks to provide loans worth of 200 
million yuan (US$ 26 million) for the start-up.5 Between 2005 and 2012, 
the local bank loans accredited to Wuxi Suntech Power Co. Ltd, once 
China's largest PV manufacturer, jumped from US$ 56 million to US$ 
3.7 billion, largely due to a municipal government mandate on local 
state-owned banks for providing low-interest loans to Suntech.6 From 
2006 to 2011, Wuxi Suntech also received tax rebates and other forms 
of refund amounting to 8.65 billion yuan (about US$ 1.42 billion) from 
the government with the aim of promoting exports.7 
    This  huge credit inﬂux into domestic PV manufacturing exacerbated 
the existing overcapacity and debt issues. By August 2012, China's top 
ten PV makers had already accumulated a combined debt of US$ 17.5 
billion, leading the whole industry to the brink of bankruptcy.8 Despite 
this worsening debt, local governments, to protect local GDP growth and 
employment, continued to grant ﬁnancial aid in all forms to save plants 
from being closed down. Under the framework of state capitalism, state-
run banks offer interest subsidies to loans for PV manufacturing and 
related technology R&D, a key sector that China wanted to support as a 
new growth point in the aftermath of the global ﬁnancial crisis. Rocketing 
bank loans as a result of government connivance exacerbated the over-
capacity and debt problems of Wuxi Suntech, which was experiencing 
weak sales and on the brink of bankruptcy in 2012. Ignoring the principle 
of prudence, the Wuxi municipal government still gave directives to the 
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local subsidiary of Bank of China, asking it to disregard the risk of default 
and grant emergency loans of 200 million yuan to the company.9
Besides direct fund injection, provision of cheap land is another ap-
proach often used by local governments to promote local PV production 
and investment.  Most PV producers need sizable industrial land for 
assembling production lines, R&D, logistical purposes, and waste and 
pollution treatment, but in the start-up phase, they usually lack sufﬁcient 
funds or collateral to acquire this. Local governments, through conﬁscat-
ing land from villagers, urban residents or other factories at very low 
prices, often have abundant landbanks to support all kinds of industrial 
enterprises. In the start-up stage in 2005, the Jiangxi-based LDK Solar 
asked for land of 7,012 mu (467 hectares) from the Jiangxi provincial 
government, which at that time had no extra land-use quota for large 
manufacturers. Jiangxi nonetheless granted land of 15,000 mu to LDK 
Solar, most of which was newly conﬁscated farmland leased to LDK at 
very low prices.10 To attract prominent domestic PV manufacturers to 
build their production lines in Heyuan City, Guangdong Province, the 
Guangdong provincial government not only shortened the approval 
process for any new PV manufacturing projects to only ﬁve working 
days, but also persuaded other enterprises in the same industrial park 
to accept land reallocation without compensation. One factory which 
had to concede part of its land right to incoming PV manufacturers 
had asked for economic compensation amounting to 40 million yuan, 
but following interference from the local government it eventually 
withdrew its claim.11         
As with many industrial sectors in China, energy consumption is 
also subsidized extensively to lower costs and thus promote the com-
petitiveness of local PV producers. As most solar PV manufacturers are 
electricity guzzlers, such energy subsidies in the forms of preferential 
electricity prices and power infrastructure support are vital for the 
survival of these producers in ﬁerce competition with their domestic 
and international peers. Electricity prices have been tightly controlled 
by the Price Bureau of the National Development and Reform Com-
mission (NDRC), the powerful department in charge of economic plans 
inside the State Council, China's cabinet. When setting power prices, the 
NDRC usually accommodates provincial stakeholders' interests and, in 
most cases, provincial ofﬁcials lobby for end-users to price low enough 
to keep their industries viable and competitive. China has set electricity 
tariffs lower than supply costs and lower than the tariffs in developed 
countries, and although electricity prices for Chinese industry appear 
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higher than those for residential use, in practice many companies do 
not bear the full costs indicated by the ofﬁcial average ﬁgures, with 
subsides or 'price adjustments' permeating the system (Haley and Haley 
2013: 38-39). Industrial sectors consume about three quarters of the total 
electricity generated in China, with local economic and social concerns 
often propelling local governments to grant power price concessions 
to high-energy-consuming industries. China's State Electricity Regula-
tory Commission once openly criticized the Sichuan and Heilongjiang 
provincial governments in its annual report for subsidizing local high-
energy-consuming enterprises like solar PV manufacturers and chemi-
cal factories by arbitrarily lowering the on-grid electricity prices sold 
to them. According to the report, between January and May 2010, the 
Heilongjiang provincial government lowered the selling price of energy 
for PV producers and other energy guzzlers from 533 yuan per thousand 
kwh to 480 yuan per thousand kwh, which helped these companies col-
lectively save 100 million yuan after they had bought electricity of 753 
million kwh at this preferential price during that period (China's State 
Electricity Regulatory Commission 2011: 13-14). Provincial governments 
sometimes broker special deals for large PV producers that have a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the local economy, or they build extra power facilities 
to ensure a direct electricity supply. In response to the enormous energy 
appetite of LDK Solar, the state-owned power company in Xinyu City 
also built six transformer substations with a total capacity of 1,520,000 
KVA (1,000 volt-amperes), equal to the capacity of the power grid in 
western Jiangxi Province, for the sole use of LDK Solar.12      
The government, at multiple levels, also gave technological, in-
frastructure and personnel support to local solar panel producers to 
enhance their competitiveness in this tech- and capital-intensive in-
dustry. Yingli Solar, the world's biggest manufacturer of solar PV, is 
based in northern China's Hebei Province. It has succeeded in setting 
up two laboratories for photovoltaic technology, with substantial tech, 
ﬁnancial and personnel support from the Chinese Ministry of Science 
and Technology and the National Energy Commission under China's 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), respectively. 
The government provided these renewable energy labs with generous 
hardware (facilities, infrastructure and funding) and software (policy, 
research staff) support, which could help local enterprises to cut the 
costs of R&D.13 ( Yingli Solar set up its own PV laboratory in January 
2010, but a large part of its initial investment of 540 million yuan actu-
ally came from the government instead of Yingli.14  
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  While contributing the largest portion to global PV production, China 
accounted for a disproportionately low share of worldwide accumulative 
PV power generation capacity. Taking advantage of the global trend 
focusing on fossil fuel replacement amidst growing public awareness 
of climate change, China's early support for the PV industry focused on 
reshaping factors of production rather than home demand conditions. 
Dominated by concerns that the exorbitant cost of installing and operat-
ing PV facilities could be a heavy ﬁnancial burden on the government, 
the state apparatus at both the central and local levels preferred to gen-
erously subsidize PV production aimed at the overseas market rather 
than endorsing nationwide feed-in tariffs that supported domestic PV 
consumption up until 2011. This strategy under the Chinese model of 
state capitalism helped the country to net bountiful trade surplus while 
its solar panel exports enjoyed twofold beneﬁts from domestic produc-
tion subsidies and overseas consumption-end subsidies in the name of 
CO2 mitigation. Ironically, the stimulation of PV production in the name 
of green development and sustainable growth did not contribute much 
to the improvement of China's own air quality and mitigation causes; on 
the contrary, China has ended up with serious pollution, high energy 
consumption and extensive debt problems associated with domestic 
overcapacity. Only under such circumstances did the Chinese govern-
ment shift its state strategy from subsidizing PV producers to subsidiz-
ing demand-end power generation, extending an above-market-price 
feed-in tariff across the entire country for the ﬁrst time in 2011. Never-
theless, the various state subsidies offered to domestic PV producers 
have not ceased under the mercantile model of state capitalism, which 
still values the expansion of trade surplus and accumulation of foreign 
reserves as its persistent national goals. The government has bailed out 
major solar panel makers like Wuxi Suntech and Shanghai Chaori from 
time to time. Shanghai Chaori, which defaulted in the country's onshore 
bond market, got a guarantee of as much as 788 million yuan (US$ 128.4 
million) from China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation on the 
solar-panel maker's 1 billion yuan of defaulted notes.15  
Domestic and International Implications 
The continuous overexpansion of solar PV manufacture, fuelled by state 
subsidies, cheap land and credit, as well as tax rebates, has profound 
domestic and international implications, forcing some domestic manu-
facturers into bankruptcy on the one hand, and triggering international 
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trade disputes with the EU and US on the other. Although the overcapac-
ity of solar PV production is global, with prices of solar panels having 
plunged in the past few years, this issue has been extremely serious in 
China, where PV manufacturing has been supported as a strategically 
important emerging industrial sector that has the potential to bring prof-
itability and employment to the country. In the solar PV sector, thanks 
to an aggressive capacity build-up in China and elsewhere, the average 
price of crystalline silicon solar modules fell by 30 per cent or more in 
2012, while thin ﬁlm prices dropped about 20 percent. China's module 
production capacity alone exceeded the global market demand. 
The overexpansion of China's solar PV sector has not only led to the 
price slump on the international markets and squeezed out foreign 
producers, it has also wiped out indigenous manufacturers and caused 
domestic debt and unemployment problems. In October 2012, the US 
Department of Commerce set anti-dumping duties ranging from 18.32 
percent to 249.96 percent on Chinese silicon photovoltaic imports and, 
in May 2013, the European Commission decided to levy preliminary 
duties of around 47 percent on Chinese solar panel imports. In 2012, 
the US Department of Commerce also imposed anti-dumping duties of 
47.59 percent on wind-turbine towers from Chengxi Shipyard and 44.99 
percent for Titan Wind Energy Suzhou Co., both based in China. 
Growing trade disputes and price slumps have put some major 
manufacturers in China under threat. Suntech Power Holdings of 
Wuxi, China's Jiangsu Province, one of the world's biggest solar panel 
manufacturers, was forced into bankruptcy court in March 2013, after 
running short on cash. It was only one of the emblematic solar panel 
makers to have suffered huge losses and laid off workers, after overes-
timating demand for their products and encountering plunging prices. 
Facing insufﬁcient cash ﬂow, weak sales, and sliding gross proﬁt, Si-
novel Wind Group, a major Chinese wind turbine maker, laid off 350 
new graduates in May 2012 and put another 350 workers, 12 percent 
of its total number of employees, on leave in November 2012. Since an 
economic slowdown in China is exacerbating the issue of excess capac-
ity, more domestic suppliers in the solar and wind sectors are expected 
to be pushed to the edge of collapse, with massive debt and weakening 
demand threatening their survival.  
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Conclusion 
The Chinese model of state capitalism, often discussed in the under-
standing of the country's meteoric economic growth over the past two 
decades, has played a crucial role in reshaping the domestic industrial 
and market circumstances that help domestic PV producers to gain 
comparative advantages over their international peers. This study has 
indicated that massive government subsidies profoundly reshaped 
factor conditions (capital, land, human resources) and supporting in-
dustries (power supply, infrastructure, etc.) to help indigenous solar PV 
ﬁrms gain competitive advantages over their foreign rivals. Nonetheless, 
even in the model of state capitalism, Porter's proposition still stands, 
as governmental interventions, regardless of their forms, can only exert 
indirect inﬂuences upon industrial competitiveness and are not direct 
determinants of national advantages. 
Since an economic slowdown in China has been exacerbating the is-
sue of excess industrial capacity, more domestic suppliers in the solar 
sectors are expected to be pushed to the brink of collapse without robust 
governmental subsidization of domestic solar PV power generation. 
Porter's theory suggests that if the Chinese government succeeds in 
reshaping the domestic demand conditions it once ignored through 
vigorously subsidizing PV power generation, China's competitiveness 
in PV manufacturing should be further uplifted. As an example exem-
plifying the afﬁnity between the country's many successful manufac-
turing industries and corresponding huge-sized domestic markets that 
nurture them, the development, generation and consumption of solar 
power are conducive to enhancing the competitiveness of solar panel 
manufacturing, by providing a sustainable and stable domestic market 
demand (Zhang et al. 2013).   
The declining cost of solar electricity and the need to control CO2 
emissions have pushed the government to nurture the domestic market 
more actively. Research has shown that in 2020, PV power generation 
in China could save 17.4 Mtce fossil energy and 46.5 Tg CO2 compared 
with 600 MWe coal-ﬁred supercritical units (Wang et al. 2014: 370). 
Also projected for 2020, the costs of solar electricity could be reduced 
by approximately 60 percent as compared to 2010, and in economically 
developed provinces, the PV electricity is 0.67-0.86 RMB/kWh, which 
is close to grid parity owing to high grid prices (Ibid.). 
Among China's four major sources of low-carbon power generation 
(hydro, nuclear, wind and solar), solar PV power generation has been 
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the least developed, with on-grid solar accounting for less than 0.1 
percent in the country's energy mix in 2012 (China Electricity Council 
2013). China's solar power generation, decoupled from the overheated 
domestic solar PV manufacturing, remains underdeveloped. In view of 
the extensive subsidies and other incentives to be offered by the govern-
ment in the next few years for the deployment of large-scale solar PV 
projects across the country, China's PV installed capacity is destined to 
grow exponentially. Such a policy reorientation for the domestic market 
is sending signals to manufacturers that the government has the long-
term planning horizon necessary to allow them to reasonably invest in 
R&D and local manufacturing infrastructure (Lewis and Wiser 2007). 
According to Porter's model of national competitive advantage, the 
revitalization of the once-ignored domestic demand is expected to form 
a positive feedback effect upon China's PV manufacturing competitive-
ness that has been hit hard by trade disputes and overcapacity.  
Chen Gang is Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University 
of Singapore. He has published extensively on China's environmental and 
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Progress (2009, Singapore: World Scientiﬁc). Email: eaicg@nus.edu.sg
NOTES
1  Bloomberg Business, 3 December 2013, 'EU Nations Approve Pact With China on So-
lar-Panel Imports.' Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
12-02/u-nations-approve-pact-with-china-on-solar-panel-trade. Accessed 5 April 
2014. 
2  The Wall Street Journal, 17 May 2013, 'Rising Wages Pose Dilemma for China.' Avail-
able at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873247670045784882
33119290670. Accessed 26 February 2014. 
3  He called these the 'four determinants of national competitive advantage'.
4  Shilling, A. Gary 2012. 'India's Accelerating Shift Toward Free Markets.' Bloomberg 
View. http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-12-17/india-s-accelerating-
shift-toward-free-markets. Accessed 26 December 2014. 
5  Meiri Jingji Xinwen 22 June 2012. 'Guangfu Yuejin Zhi Hangye Fansi: Difang Zhengfu 
de Chongdong Yu Niai' ('Reﬂection on PV expansion: impulse from local govern-
ments') at http://ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20120622/014712378110.
shtml. Accessed 1 April 2014.
6  China Business Times, 28 March 2013. 'Shangde Jiaocha Weiyue Jingneiwai Zhaiquan 
Youbie' ('Different impact of Suntech's default in domestic and overseas bond mar-
ket') at http://business.sohu.com/20130328/n370658622.shtml. Accessed 1 April 
2014. 
7  Ibid.
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8  Caijing, 8 August 2012. 'China's Photovoltaic Industry on Brink of Bankruptcy: 
Report' at http://english.caijing.com.cn/2012-08-08/111998243.html. Accessed 1 
April 2014. 
9  China Business News, 28 September 2012. 'Shangde Huo Wuxishi Zhengfu Zhichi' 
('Suntech Got Support from Wuxi Government') at http://news.xinhuanet.com/
fortune/2012-09/28/c_123772652.htm. Accessed 2 April 2014. 
10  Meiri Jingji Xinwen, 22 June 2012.
11  Ibid.
12  Meiri Jingji Xinwen, 22 June 2012.
13  Interview with NDRC policymakers, Beijing, 2 March 2012.
14  See Yingli Solar at http://www.yinglisolar.com/en/. Accessed 10 July 2014.
15  China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation, established by the Chinese govern-
ment in 1999, is a state-backed fund that helps large-sized companies, most of which 
are state-owned enterprises, to restructure their bad debts in the domestic market. 
See Bloomberg News, 8 October 2014, 'China's First Bond Defaulter Gets Guarantee 
From Bad Bank.'  Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-
10-07/chaori-solar-restructuring-plan-seeks-haircuts-up-to-80-. Accessed 1 January 
2015.  
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